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This Note has shown that when  a by-election  produces a result  that is out of line 
with  the current national  trend, then  this  deviation  is  reflected  in  the  result  at the 
following general election. I am grateful to a referee for the observation that similarly 
enduring effects may arise from atypical local or Euro-elections. 
Constituency Service and Incumbency Advantage 
GARY KING* 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Numerous  scholars have  documented  a dramatic increase  in  incumbency advantage 
in  US congressional elections  and  also state legislative  elections  over  the  past  four 
decades.'  For example,  Gelman  and  King  show  that  incumbents  in  the  House of 
Representatives  now  receive  about twelve  extra  percentage points  solely  as a result 
of holding congressional office during the campaign;'  the comparable figure for most 
of the first  half  of this century was only 2  per  cent. This advantage of incun~bency 
has made members of the  US House and many state legislators  nearly  invulnerable 
to electoral defeat. 
Many agree that incumbents' use of constituency service explains their widening lead 
over  challengers.  The perquisites  of  legislative office  include the  franking privilege, 
money for travel to the constituency, staff support and other benefits that enable members 
of  congress  to  provide  many  services  to,  and  answer  many  specific  requests  of, 
* Department of Government. Harvard University. Thanks to Mo Fiorina for helpful comments. 
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individual constituents. The operating budget each legislator has at his or her disposal 
is a reasonable aggregate measure of the amount of this constituency service, and this 
figure has nearly rloublerlin the US House in only the last ten years.' 
Thus, most scholars believe that increasing levels of constituency service have given 
incumbents their dramatic electoral advantage over the last several decades. However, 
as plausible as this theory is.  only scattered empirical evidence directly supports this 
relationship.  In  fact, some empirical research indicates that increases in constituency 
service actually reduce an incumbent's inherent advantage, a wholly implausible finding 
which no one really believes.  Indeed, Cain. Ferejohn and Fiorina review the literature 
seeking to explain the rise in incumbency advantage. They explain that existing empirical 
evidence could lead one to 
the remarkable conclusion that House incumbents can close their district ofices. fire their staffs. 
stop doing casework, abandon  their quest  for federal  money. give up  their  district  residences. 
choose committees purely  on the basis of personal interest. tell  the political  action committees 
where to put their  money.  and still get  as many votes - perhaps more - than if  they continued 
to behave as incumbents presently do.' 
Although confronted with  this  large body of contradictory empirical evidence, Cain. 
Ferejohn and Fiorina,' and the authors of most studies they review, persist in believing 
that increases in constituency service partly explain the increase in incumbency advan- 
tage.' 
Thus, either this relatively strong scholarly consensus is wrong,- or the methodology 
of existing studies is lacking. As one might  expect,  Cain, Ferejohn  and Fiorinah and 
most others. favour the latter option. They suggest three methodological problems that 
may have accounted for these counter-intuitive findings: level of analysls problems (using 
survey data even  though most  measures of constituency service are constant within 
districts),  measurement  error and simultaneous causation. In Sect~on  11,  I show that 
most of the methodological problems in previous studies reduce to a single problem, 
and in Section III I provide one way to solve this problem. 
Empirical  results  appear  in  Section  IV,  and  Section v  concludes.  These  sections 
demonstrate that, for state legislative elections. the long-hypothesized but elusive rela- 
tionship between constituency service and incumbency advantage actually exists. Jewel1 
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and Breaux provide an excellent overview of incumbency effects in the state legislative 
election data used here.' 
I1  PROBLEMS 
In  this  section.  I demonstrate how  methodological  problems  in  this  literature  have 
led  to such counter-intuitive  findings. It  turns out that  most  of the methodological 
problems in the literature reduce to a single one: the dependent variable used in most 
studies is incumbent votes instead of incumbency advantage. 
I formalize this problem by usicg Alford and Brady's distinction between  (but not 
their measures of) the incumbent's personal electoral advantage (I) and the predisposi- 
tions  of  voters  to favour the  incumbent's  political  party (P).Iu  I write  the expected 
proportion voting for the incumbent (V) as the sum of expected incumbency advantage 
and expected partisan predispositions: 
Denote a vector of explanatory variables that includes in the first column some measure 
of constituency service as X. The implicit model in much of the literature can be written 
as follows: 
where p  is a vector of effect  parameters.  the first  element of which. PI, is the effect 
of constituency service on incumbency advantage. 
The typical approach used  in  the literature to estimate P  is to regress the vote for 
the  incumbent  V on  the  explanatory variables X.  Let  the  first  element  of  the least 
squares estimator h,  h,.  refer to the estimated effect of constituency service on incumbency 
advantage from this regression. 
To see the relationship between  the estimator  b and the parameter ,O.  we  take the 
expected value of h (the average over hypothetical replications of the same elections). 
If the expected  value of a parameter  estimate equals the  parameter one is trying  to 
estimate, then the estimator is said  to be  'unbiased'. The expected  value of h  (which 
we would like to be P)  is calculated as follows: 
where y is a vector of coefficients from a theoretical regression of voters' partisan predis- 
positions  to  vote  for  the  incumbent  candidate  on  the  explanatorq  variables.  X 
[Y  = (XIX)-'XIE(P)].  The first element of y, y,, is the regression of partisan predisposi- 
tions on constituency service, controlling for the other explanatory variables. 
If  y, is  nonzero.  then  the  estimated  effect  of  constituency  service on incumbency 
"  Malcolm E. Jenell and David Breaux. The  EKect of Incumbency on State Legislative Elections'. 
Legislirtire Studies Qucrrterlj. 13 ( 1989). 495-514. 
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advantage, b,, is biased. By definition, in the short term, constituency service can have 
no direct effect on partisan predispositions.  However, when  partisan  predispositions 
drop enough to put  an incumbent in  danger of  losing  the next  election, he  or she 
will likely step up service to their district so that the incumbency effect (0  might compen- 
sate. Because of this simultaneity effect, y, is probably negative. 
For example, consider  two newly  elected  representatives, one elected  with  51  per 
cent of the vote and the other with 65 per cent. Since these candidates were not incum- 
bents during this election, these figures are reasonable estimates of partisan predisposi- 
tions, P, in  their districts. Certainly  the candidate with  51  per  cent  is  likely  to feel 
more vulnerable and may therefore do more constituency service, other things being 
equal. More generally, when partisan predispositions decrease, constituency service is 
likely  to increase (i.e., y < 0). (In this example, incumbency advantage, which cannot 
occur until the second election. can have no effect on the level of constituency service.) 
For specific representatives who have been elected several times, distinguishing which 
part of their observed vote,  V,  is partisan predispositions, P, and which is incumbency 
advantage, I, is difficult or impossible. Indeed. no measures have ever been proposed. 
However, we  should be  fairly certain that P > I, since no one has even  claimed  that 
incumbency  advantage is  as high  as  15 per  cent,"  whereas  V -  I = P must  be  at 
least  three times as large  for incumbents (since incumbents are all winners and thus 
V > 0.5). Thus, the most significant part of  V is still P, and the directions of causality 
are probably as follows: when partisan predispositions drop, the level of constituency 
service increases to compensate, which. in turn, increases the incumbency advantage. 
Thus, PI > 0 and y, < 0. 
The methodological  problem  is  that  h, is an unbiased  estimate of PI + y, instead 
of p,. Furthermore, since y, is  probably negative,  computing b, gives an answer that 
is too small and possibly negative. This is the primary reason previous  scholars have 
found the effect of constituency service on incumbency advantage to be  near zero or 
negative.  Rivers and Fiorina derive a similar result  from a formal model of a typical 
legislator's incentives." 
Because the amount of constituency service that members of a legislature  perform 
depends in part on the partisan predispositions of voters in their districts, P, a cross- 
sectional analysis of all the districts within a year is unlikely to reveal the desired evidence. 
Take, for example, a simple model where all members gather and spend resources to 
maximize their chances of re-election. The average level of constituency service in the 
House probably  depends on the availability of the resources  that members will seek 
out (such as the  franking privilege.  funds  to hire staff, etc.). However, variation  in 
constituency service across members within any one congress would depend more on 
differences in partisan  predispositions (as a measure of expected vote) than anything 
else. To  use constituency service for a particular member of the House as an explanatory 
variable entails the assumption that constituency service is not determined by the partisan 
predisposition  of that district, which  is equivalent to assuming that members do not 
use the means at their disposal to improve re-election prospects. Although one might 
reasonably argue that a member has goals in addition to re-election, it would be folly 
I'  See Gelman and King, 'Estimating Incumbency Advantage without Bias'. 
''  Douglas Rivers and Morris P. Fiorina. 'Constituency Service. Reputation. and the Incumbency 
Advantage', in Morris P. Fiorina and David Rohde, eds, Honle Style rind  W"~shirzgtoli  W?jrk (Ann 
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to  think  that the  vast  majority  of  members  have  no interest  in  the  next  election." 
Unfortunately, most previous researchers make precisely this mistake. 
111  SOLUTIONS 
The solution to the methodological problems described in the previous section requires 
two components: first, we  need  a measure of the incumbency advantage, I, and use 
it, instead  of votes,  V,  in the constituency service regression. Secondly, we should not 
use actual constituency service for individual members as a measure (since it is endoge- 
nous). Instead, we use the average level of resources that members coulduse for constitu- 
ency  service - the  legislative  operating  budget.  Included  in  a  member's  legislative 
operating budget is money for mailings, travel back to the district, phone calls, news- 
letters and staff; these  and other items are primarily used  to provide services  to the 
member's constituents. Because this measure is the same for each legislator in  a state 
for each year, it is exogenous to individual members' resource-seeking and constituency 
service activities in the short term.14 Although members' legislative  operating budgets 
may  be  endogenous in  the  long run, they are unlikely  to be  a  function  of P for a 
single legislative term. 
We  therefore  require  a measure  of  incumbency advantage averaged  over  districts 
for a single year for each legislature."  Since incumbency advantage and constituency 
service are much more variable  within  and across state legislatures  than within  the 
US House, state legislatures are a particularly convenient place to test this hypothesis. 
The primary difference between state legislatures and the US congress relevant to this 
analysis is that both incumbency advantage and each legislator's  operating budget are 
larger in the US congress. No evidence or theory exists to indicate that the rrlationship 
between the two differs at all in these legislative bodies. On the other hand, the larger 
variation  in operating budgets (and thus constituency service) across states and years 
than across years in congress makes state legislative elections a particularly appropriate 
place to test this hypothesis. 
To estimate the incumbency advantage, I, for a particular state legislature and election 
year,  I  use  Gelman  and King's  unbiased  estimator based  on a  regression  of  a pair 
of election  years."  To estimate  this  quantity, denote  v,, and  vz, as the  Democratic 
proportions of the two-party vote in district i in a state in elections 1 and 2, respectively. 
" Note that  using  a  lagged  value  of P as a control. as some  scholars have  done. is  not  a 
solution to this endogeneity problem. Indeed. in  some cases. introducing an additional control 
variable can actually cause more bias  and inefficiency than less, especially when  testing causal 
hypotheses. 
I'  This measure was studied in the US Congress by Nelson W. Polsby, 'The Institutionalization 
of  the House of  Representatives',  ilt~erican  Poliricul  Science Rel'iew. 62 (1968), 144-68.  Table 
6. 
I'  In addition to the endogeneity problems caused by using constituency service at the district 
level, no measure of district-levet incumbency advantage has ever been proposed. I therefore move 
to the legislature  as the level of  analysis.  Because this produces only a single number for each 
election  year.  we  would  need  a very  long time-series  of  congressional election  years  to study 
the effect of constituency service. I therefore move to state legislative data. 
Ih  Gelman and King. 'Estimating Incumbency Advantage', also show that every other measure 
of incumbency advantage proposed in the literature is biased or inconsistent. 124  Notes and Commeizts 
Let R, equal 1 if a Democratic incumbent runs for re-election, 0 if no incumbent runs, 
and -  1  if  a Republican  incumbent  is  seeking re-election,  in election  2. In addition. 
P, is  1 if  the  Democrat wins  election  I  and -  1  if  the Republican  wins.  For a pair 
of election years,  the estimate of the incumbency advantage I on a linear regression 
of votes on incumbency status. controlling for previous votes and partisan swing: 
where the least squares estimate of Iis  the estimate of incumbency advantage. 
An important topic for future research is working out how to measure incumbency 
advantage in states with  multi-member districts. Since this problem has not yet been 
solved  (or even  analysed  in detail), I restrict  the present analysis to the  lower  house 
of state legislatures which use only single member districting systems. I use all elections 
for which data exist, that is even numbered years from 1968 to 1986 in thirteen states." 
I estimate I for every adjacent pair of years in each of these states in which district 
lines  do not  change. The results (and the list  of  states) appear with  their  standard 
errors in Table 1. 
A convenient summary of the information in Table 1 appears in Figure 1. The curve 
in  Figure  1  is a  smooth version  of a  histogram  called  a  'kernel  density estimate'." 
In addition,  I represent  each  measure  of  incumbency  advantage (for one state and 
year) with a short vertical line at the bottom of the graph; in this way, Figure 1 helps 
to illumlnate patterns in  the data without losing much  information from Table  1. In 
most of the elections, incumbents receive just under five extra percentage points, solely 
because  they were previously  elected. Another large group of states have incumbency 
advantages of about seven to twelve percentage points. Eight of the estimates are nega- 
tive, but these generally have larger standard errors; none is significantly negative. The 
variability across states and over time is also considerable. 
IV  EMPIRICAL  RESULTS 
The measures of incumbency advantage reported in  Table  1 serve as the dependent 
variable. I use the legislative operating budget as a measure of the available resources 
that could be used for constituency service. The measure is  in units of ten  thousand 
1986 inflation-adjusted dollars. This variable  is  not perfect  since these funds can be 
and are used by legislators for items other than constituency service. However. because 
these budget figures are measured at the level of the legislature, considerable portions 
of  this  measurement error will cancel out in  the aggregation process. In addition, a 
standard  statistical result  is that any remaining random measurement error will bias 
the estimate towards zero. so the true coefficient will be larger than the one I estimate 
below. Since  this  stacks the methodological  deck  against finding the expected  effect, 
future research should develop better time-series-cross-sectional  measures. Nevertheless, 
any effect found below is even stronger support for this procedure and the constituency 
'-  These data are available from the ICPSR and were originally collected under the direction 
of Professor Malcolm Jewell. 
'"ee  B. W. Silverman. Densitj Esritmtion for  Srirtistics md  Dutir Alzu/j,sis (London: Chapman 
and Hall. 1986).  When one draws a histogram, a choice must be made as to the size and number 
of bars. which effectively provides a compromise between  averaging to find  patterns (few bars) 
and accurately representing the original data (many bars). For kernel density estimates, this same 
compromise  is  made by  the value  of  the  'smoothing  parameter'.  For the example in  the text, 
I use half the value of the standard error for each observation as its smoothing parameter. Notes und Cornrnents  125 
Proportion advantage 
Fig. 1. Incirtiihency ndwntcrge, thirteen sture.5, 1968-86 
hror~:  The curve  in  this  figure is a smooth version  of  a histogram called  a 'Density Estimate'. 
and can be interpreted as a histogram: the area under the curve between two values of incumbency 
advantage  (on the  horizontal  axis) gives the approximate proportion of  obser\ations falling in 
that  range. The total area under the  curve  is  equal  to  1.0. Each datum is  also  represented  in 
the figure with a small vertical line at the bottom of the graph, hence preserving as much information 
as possible. 
Source: Table 1. 
service hypothesis. I also include the legislator's salary and twelve Oil indicator variables 
to represent  the  thirteen  states, as controls. These indicator variables guard against 
the possibility  that the proportion  of  the legislative operating budgets that could be 
used  for constituency service varies across states. In other words. including the state 
indicator variables equalizes what are at first very different state political systems and 
enables one to test for the effect of constituency service within each state. Including 
salary as a control ensures that the coefficient for operating budget reflects constituency 
service and not the attraction that incumbents might have for the job because  of its 
financial compensation.'" 
Finally, instead  of a least  squares regression.  I use the standard errors in Table 1 
''I  The budget and  salary data are taken from Paul Brace. 'The American Statehouse Trans- 
formed: Longitudinal and Cross-Sectional Analysis of Changing Legislative Resources' (New York: 
New York University. mimeo. 1987). w  Scn  Zcn  Sm  GQ  Sm  cm  Gm  Gm  Zw  S- S 
m--mm-m-O-t.mWmm-mwmmmm 
0000000000000000000000 Notes and Conmmts  127 
as weights in a weighted least squares regression analysis. This procedure weights those 
observations about which we have most information the heaviest." 
TABLE 2  Weighted Lecrst Squcrres Regressions oJ  Incutnhenrj, Adwntagr 




Colorado  0.1288  0.0464  0.2427  0.0830 
Conecticut  0.1217  0.0462  0.2430  0.0848 
Delaware  0.1777  0.0499  0.2962  0.0917 
Iowa  0.1427  0.0447  0.2674  0.0842 
Michigan  0.0698  0.0341  0.1281  0.05 11 
Missouri  0.1099  0.0436  0.2397  0.0780 
New York  0.038  1  0.0225  0.0967  0.03  1  1 
Ohio  0.1098  0.0403  0.2032  0.0715 
Pennsylvania  0.0424  0.0296  0.0944  0.0452 
Rhode Island  0.1409  0.05 18  0.2772  0.0998 
Utah  0.1232  0.0510  0.2472  0.0976 
Wisconsin  0.1012  0.0419  0.2021  0.0709 
Lag(1ncAd)  -0.0694  0.1389 
11  88  52 
The first two columns of numbers in Table 2 represent the main test of the constituency 
service hypothesis. The second pair of columns add the lagged value of the dependent 
variable in the regression  as an example of one of the tests I ran for autocorrelation. 
The coefficient on the legislative operating budget did not drop; indeed, it significantly 
increased. This is additional evidence of the validity of the first regression. However, 
since including this lagged term requires dropping one observation for each cross-section 
and redistricting period  (reducing the sample size from 88 to 52). I focus on the first 
regression." 
The two numbers of primary interest in this table are the coefficient on the budget 
figure  and its standard  error, both  presented  in  boxes.  The coefficient  is  significant 
and positive, indicating that constituency service has a systematic effect on incumbency 
'"  Strictly  speaking, the disturbance  term  in  this  model  comes  only from the uncertainly  in 
estimating I. That is, i=  XD  + E. One could add another disturbance term, allowing Iitself. rather 
than just  I^.  to be  a random variable: ~(j)  =I=  Xb  +  t. In  theory, this would  produce slightly 
more elficient  estimates (if this alternative model  is true), but using the simpler model, even if 
this model is right, causes no statistical bias. Furthermore, a recent paper demonstrates that estima- 
tors of  the  two  models  produce  virtually  identical  inferences  in  practice.  both  for coefficients 
and  standard errors. See John E. Jackson.  'Estimation  of  Variable Coefficient  Models'  (paper 
presented at the annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association. Chicago. 1990). 
''  I also did tests for autocorrelation and nonstationarity in  incumbency advantage and in the 
explanatory variables. These tests included additional lag terms, linear and quadratic trend terms. 
using difference of incumbency advantage and other techniques. None of these materially altered 
my substantive conclusions. 128  Notes crnd Cor~znlrnts 
advantage. Specifically, an extra $10,000 added to the budget of the average state legisla- 
tor gives  this incumbent an additional  1.54 percentage point advantage in  the  next 
election. The 95 per cent confidence interval ranges from an effect of 1.14 to 1.94 percent- 
age points. so we can be sure both that the effect is positive and that it is fairly strong." 
V  CONCLUSION 
This Note addresses the long-standing discrepancy between scholarly support for the 
effect of constituency service on incumbency advantage and a large body of contradictory 
empirical evidence.  I  first  show  that many  of  the  methodological  problems  noticed 
in past research reduce to a single measurement problem that is readily resolved. The 
core of the Note then provides among the first  systematic empirical  evidence for the 
constituency service hypothesis. Future research still needs to demonstrate this effect 
in data from congressional elections. a more difficult task given the more limited variation 
of constituency service and incumbency advantage and the small number of observations. 
" The boot-strapped  standard error is 0.006, so we  can have confidence that even  if  certain 
model assumptions are invalid,  this coefficient is still significantly greater than zero. I also tested 
for a nonlinear  relationship by  using  the log of the  budget and salary figures. These nonlinear 
results were  somewhat stronger than those presented in Table 2, indicating diminishing returns 
for successively  larger  increments in the legislative  operating budget. The results in  the text are 
the best linear approximation to this nonlinear result and also are simpler to explain and interpret. 